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Corporate FilingsLawGovernment Statistics

Each report claim is color-coded by how faithfully it represents its cited SEC source. Click a highlighted claim for the verdict detail. supported partial unsupported cannot verify

tc_101contradictionunsupported

In Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex, leaving each State free to decline to recognize same-sex marriages lawfully performed elsewhere. (Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015))

ClaimThe Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment does NOT require states to license or recognize same-sex marriages.
CitationObergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015)
Citation matchmismatch
Resolutionblocked
Confidencehigh
Source anchorThe Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-State.
ReasoningThe claim directly contradicts the holding of Obergefell v. Hodges. The source explicitly states the Fourteenth Amendment DOES require states to license and recognize same-sex marriages, whereas the claim asserts the opposite — that the Amendment does NOT impose such requirements. [Source host restricted automated retrieval (status: blocked); verified against the provided source text. In production the analyst can upload the source.]
tc_102numeric mismatchunsupported

Writing for the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 567 U.S. 644 (2013), Chief Justice Roberts held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize such a marriage when lawfully licensed and performed out-of-State. (Obergefell v. Hodges, 567 U.S. 644 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.))

tc_103scope expansionunsupported

In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place in any context and that all racially separate public facilities are inherently unequal. (Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954))

tc_104supported

In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Chief Justice Warren, writing for a unanimous Court, concluded that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place and that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. (Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Warren, C.J.))

tc_105overstatementunsupported

In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that any statement obtained from a suspect who was not first advised of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel is automatically inadmissible for all purposes in every criminal proceeding, with no exceptions. (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Warren, C.J.))

tc_106contradictionunsupported

Writing for the Court in Miranda v. Arizona, Justice William J. Brennan held that the prosecution may not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Brennan, J.))

tc_107overstatementunsupported

In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Supreme Court held that any person too poor to hire a lawyer is constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel in any legal proceeding in which they cannot afford representation. (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963))

tc_108supported

In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court held that an indigent defendant who cannot afford a lawyer cannot be assured a fair trial in a criminal case unless counsel is provided for him. (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Black, J.))

tc_109contradictionunsupported

In Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), the Supreme Court held that the Government may suppress political speech based on the speaker's corporate identity, upholding restrictions on independent corporate expenditures under the First Amendment. (Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010))

tc_110overstatementunsupported

Under Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), the government is absolutely barred from regulating any form of corporate political spending whatsoever, including direct contributions to candidates and all disclosure requirements. (Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010))

tc_111contradictionunsupported

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment categorically bars any public official from ever recovering damages for defamatory falsehoods about their conduct, establishing an absolute immunity for the press when reporting on government affairs. (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964))

tc_112contradictionunsupported

Writing for the Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1971), Justice Felix Frankfurter held that a public official may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves the statement was made with 'actual malice'—knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of whether it was false. (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1971) (Frankfurter, J.))

tc_113contradictionunsupported

In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), Justice Clark, writing for the Court, held that evidence obtained through searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution remains admissible in state court proceedings, declining to extend the exclusionary rule to the states. (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Clark, J.))

tc_114supported

In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), Justice Clark, writing for the majority, held that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court, extending the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to state prosecutions. (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Clark, J.))

tc_115wrong attributionunsupported

Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roger Taney declared in 1819 that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is," establishing the power of judicial review. (Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (U.S. 1819) (Taney, C.J.))

tc_116fabricated citationcannot verify

The Supreme Court first recognized the federal judiciary's power to strike down unconstitutional statutes in Calder v. Pinckney County Board of Elections, 7 U.S. 219 (1804), where the Court held that "a legislative act contrary to the constitution can have no binding force." (Calder v. Pinckney County Board of Elections, 7 U.S. 219 (U.S. 1804))